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NOTES
The Cost of Free Speech: Combating
Fake News or Upholding the First
Amendment?
BRITTANY FINNEGAN*
This Note examines the pervasive and evolving “fake news”
problem. Specifically, it explores whether the United States government could pass legislation, modeled after a recently passed German law, regulating propagandistic social media posts. The answer
to this question, in short, is no. By comparing the German Basic Law
and the U.S. Constitution, this Note highlights the stringency of U.S.
First Amendment protections and underscores the U.S. government’s inability to combat fake news through legislation. While this
Note primarily focuses on the prevalence of fake news in the context
of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, related developments and areas of research continue to emerge. Nevertheless, the underlying
analysis and conclusions this Note sets forth can be applied to the
2020 U.S. presidential election as well as the local, state, and congressional elections that have since occurred. Indeed, 2020 has
proven that the fake news problem remains omnipresent, and the
government is still unable to regulate it.
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INTRODUCTION
The amazing growth of social networking and online media over
the last twenty years has given rise to what many call a “fake news”1
epidemic.2 The dissemination of false information—aimed to
1

See Ryan Kraski, Combating Fake News in Social Media: U.S. and German Legal Approaches, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 923, 923–24 (2017) (defining
“fake news” in context of social media and relatively new phenomena of instant,
internet media “reporting”).
2
See Andrea Diaz, ‘Misinformation’ Is Crowned Dictionary.com’s Word of
the Year, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018, 6:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/
11/26/us/misinformation-dictionary-word-of-the-year-2018-trnd/index.html. In
fact, in 2018, “misinformation” was deemed the word of the year. Id. Additionally, “fake news” was used so much, that Oxford English Dictionary now recognizes it as an official word. See New Words list October 2019, OXFORD ENG.
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influence democratic elections3 and to incite hate4—has spread
across the globe. Countries are now faced with a predicament: pass
legislation to combat fake news or refrain from regulation due to
free speech laws.5
Part I of this Note defines the term “fake news” and highlights
the present dialogue surrounding the phenomena. Part II then explores a statute, passed in Germany, regulating social media posts.
The statute, the Network Enforcement Act6 (the “NEA”), requires
social media companies to remove criminal content from their sites.
This Part also explores German Basic Law and whether the NEA
would be considered constitutional by exploring German freedom
of expression doctrine.7 Part III then analyzes whether a similar law
to the NEA, if passed in the United States, would be constitutional
or violate the First Amendment.
Lastly, this Note will discuss counter-speech as a viable alternative to combating fake news propaganda online.8 Specifically, this
Note argues that counter-speech, as it stands in the United States, is
not as effective as it could be. By comparing the United Kingdom’s
news infrastructure, specifically the British Broadcasting Corporation (“BBC”) network, to the current public broadcasting networks
in the United States, this Note highlights the shortcomings of the
DICTIONARY (Oct. 2019) https://public.oed.com/updates/new-words-list-october2019/.
3
See infra Part I.B.
4
Id.
5
See Molly Quell, More Countries Pass ‘Fake News’ Laws in Pandemic
Era, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (June 5, 2020), https://www.courthouse
news.com/more-countries-pass-fake-news-laws-in-pandemic-era/;
Ashley
Westerman, ‘Fake News’ Law Goes into Effect in Singapore, Worrying Free
Speech Advocates, NPR (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/02/
766399689/fake-news-law-goes-into-effect-in-singapore-worrying-free-speechadvocates.
6
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NETZDG] [Network Enforcement Act],
Sept. 1, 2017, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] I at 3352 (Ger.);
official translation at http://perma.cc/72JK-3KNM [hereinafter NetzDG].
7
See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] [CONSTITUTION], art. 5 (Ger.)
[hereinafter [GG] [BASIC LAW]], translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/.
8
See Daniel Jones & Susan Benesch, Combating Hate Speech Through
Counterspeech, BERKMAN KLEIN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC. AT HARVARD
UNIV. (Aug. 9, 2019), https://cyber.harvard.edu/story/2019-08/combating-hatespeech-through-counterspeech.
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U.S. news infrastructure. This Note concludes by arguing that the
U.S. government should invest in the Corporate Public Broadcasting
(the “CPB”) to increase the quality, quantity, and reliability of counter-speech efforts in the United States.
I.

WHAT IS FAKE NEWS?

A.
Definition
Fake news9 is not a new concept.10 Since the inception of the
newspaper, and even before then, there has been truth manipulation,
propaganda, and the dissemination of false information throughout
society.11 However, the term “fake news”12 has many different
meanings. The definition of fake news, for the purpose of this Note,
refers to the phenomenon of false, unsupported assertions of fact or
information spreading across the internet, specifically the unique
misinformation posted on social media for political purposes.13 This
misinformation can have disastrous consequences for the
9

Kraski, supra note 1, at 923–24 (defining “fake news” in the context of
social media and the relatively new phenomena of instant, internet media “reporting”).
10
See Steven Seidenberg, Fake News Has Long Held a Role in American
History, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/history_fake_news; Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 845, 846 n.1 (2018).
11
See Shankar Vendatam et al., Fake News: An Origin Story, NPR (June 25,
2018, 9:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/25/623231337/fake-news-anorigin-story.
12
See Kraski, supra note 1, at 923–24 (defining “fake news” in context of
social media and relatively new phenomena of instant, internet media “reporting”); Ashley Smith-Roberts, Facebook, Fake News, and the First Amendment,
95 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 119 (2018) (“The Booking Institution defines fake
news as content ‘generated by outlets that masquerade as actual media sites but
promulgate false or misleading accounts designed to deceive the public.’”); Nina
I. Brown & Jonathan Peters, Say This, Not That: Government Regulation and
Control of Social Media, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 521, 521–22 (2018) (defining fake
news as “a media product fabricated and disguised to look like credible news that
is posted online and circulated via social media.”).
13
Miles Parks, Social Media Usage Is at An All-Time High. That Could Mean
A Nightmare for Democracy, NPR (May 27, 2020, 5:02 AM), https://
www.npr.org/2020/05/27/860369744/social-media-usage-is-at-an-all-time-highthat-could-mean-a-nightmare-for-democr.
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democratic process.14 For instance, misinformation online destabilizes the truth, making it harder for people to discern what is real
and what is false.15 This destabilization can lead people to form
opinions and thoughts on false facts, which in turn influence how
they vote in elections.16
B.
Fake News in Real Life
Fake news is disseminated across social media platforms every
day.17 The propagation of such information has, arguably, greatly
impacted public life and democratic political processes as a whole.18
It is almost impossible to watch the nightly news or listen to a political press conference without hearing the term “fake news.”19 According to one study, in 2016 alone, the twenty largest fake news
stories posted online, many centering around the presidential election, “generated 8.7 million shares, reactions, and comments” on social media.20 In contrast, the top twenty news stories from legitimate
news sites only generated 7.4 million interactions.21
As the term fake news continues to proliferate political dialogue,
many believe that it poses a “unique threat” to informed
14

See Sabrina Tavernise & Aidan Gardiner, ‘No One Believes Anything’:
Voters Worn Out by a Fog of Political News, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/us/polls-media-fake-news.html.
These
consequences may be complete disengagement from the democratic process, and
mistrust of the news altogether, creating a “new normal” in society where “[m]any
people are numb and disoriented, struggling to discern what is real.” Id.
15
See Caroline Mala Corbin, The Unconstitutionality of Government Propaganda, 81 OHIO L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 21).
16
See Nat Stern, Judicial Candidates’ Right to Lie, 77 MD. L. REV. 774, 781
(2018) (“[D]issemination of misinformation to the voting public threatens to defeat the very promise of democratic self-government. The success of this system
depends on the ability of citizens to make reasoned choices about the alternative
visions they are offered.”).
17
See Theodore Weng, Social Media Has Been Hiding a Fake News Problem, L. TECH. TODAY (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/
2020/08/social-media-has-been-hiding-a-fake-news-problem/.
18
See Stern, supra note 16.
19
See, e.g., Fake News, NPR, https://www.npr.org/tags/502124007/fakenews (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
20
Darrell M. West, How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation,
BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-tocombat-fake-news-and-disinformation/.
21
Id.
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democracies.22 Fake news has, thus, raised concern across the globe,
posing the question of whether social media companies should bear
the responsibility of regulating the content posted on their sites.23
This concern centers particularly around Russian interference in the
2016 United States presidential election, the 2016 Brexit vote in the
United Kingdom, and the 2017 election of President Macron in
France.24
In the United States, a grand jury indicted thirteen Russian individuals for their connection to what the U.S. Department of Justice
called a “[s]cheme to [i]nterfere in the United States [P]olitical
[S]ystem.”25 The interference in the 2016 presidential election allegedly had two prongs: (1) “the hacking and leaking of e-mails from
the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton’s campaign
chairman, John Podesta” and (2) “a campaign of misinformation and
propaganda carried out largely over social media.”26 The indictment,
however, only relates to the second prong.27
In the years since the 2016 election, it has become even more
clear how deeply Russian “troll farms” infiltrate social media sites

22

Nabiha Syed, Real Talk about Fake News: Towards a Better Theory for
Platform Governance, 127 YALE L.J. F. 337, 337 (2017).
23
See Giancarlo F. Frosio, Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? From Intermediary Liability to Responsibility, 26 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 1, 1 (2017) (discussing theory of intermediary liability and its application to social media companies); Liat Clark, Facebook and Twitter Must Tackle Hate Speech or Face New
Laws, WIRED UK (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/us-tech-giantsmust-tackle-hate-speech-or-face-legal-action (arguing that social media companies should prioritize critical thinking to tackle fake news).
24
Jan van der Made, Russian Outlets Sparked Macron’s Fake News Law
Plan, Analysts, RFI (Jan. 4, 2018, 5:17 PM), http://en.rfi.fr/europe/20180104france-fake-news-law-macron-russia-angry-deny-sputnik-rt.
25
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the
United States Political System (Feb. 16, 2018) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Justice
Press Release], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/grand-jury-indicts-thirteen-russian-individuals-and-three-russian-companies-scheme-interfere.
26
Adrian Chen, What Mueller’s Indictment Reveals about Russia’s Internet
Research Agency, NEW YORKER (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/what-muellers-indictment-reveals-about-russias-internet-research-agency.
27
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, supra note 25.
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and flood them with misinformation.28 According to one study,29
which has tracked Russian online information operations since
2014, Russia used thousands of botnets, teams of paid human
“trolls,” and networks of websites and social-media accounts to
“amplify” false or misleading internet posts.30 Specifically, the
study reveals that Russia disseminated propaganda material online
to: (1) “tarnish democratic leaders or undermine institutions”; (2)
weaken both “citizen and investor confidence” in capitalist economies; (3) magnify social issues; and (4) “promote fear of global calamity.”31
The study also explicitly states that there were “a number of
technical indicators,” that Russian propaganda affected the 2016
United States presidential election. 32 Most telling was the “synchronization of messaging and disinformation” by thousands of Russian
bots.33 Collectively, these bots were posting massive amounts of disinformation online, flooding the internet with hundreds of posts a
day.34 The study also revealed that Russia’s activities on social media “could tip the balance of an electoral outcome by influencing a
small fraction of a voting public,”35 and that social media in general
can effect controversial political decisions such as the Brexit vote
and other political elections across the globe.36
Overall, Clint Watts, one of the co-authors of the study, a fellow
at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and senior fellow at the
Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at George Washington
University, stated that Russian propaganda online advanced a
28

The Daily, The Sunday Read: ‘The Agency’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/20/podcasts/the-daily/russia-trolls-misinformation.html (discussing a Russian communications agency, “The Internet Research Agency” that employed thousands of people to act as internet “trolls”
whose job was to interfere in American society and elections).
29
Andrew Weisburd et al., Trolling for Trump: How Russia Is Trying to Destroy Our Democracy, WAR ON ROCKS (Nov. 6, 2016), https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/trolling-for-trump-how-russia-is-trying-to-destroy-ourdemocracy/.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Weisburd et al., supra note 29.
35
Id.
36
Id.
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political agenda to “erode trust in mainstream media, public figures,
government institutions—everything that holds the unity of the Republic together.”37
II.
THE GERMAN SOLUTION TO FAKE NEWS
In Germany, fake news and the effect of online propaganda on
society was a growing problem.38 After the Charlie Hebdo attacks
in Paris in 2015, the dissemination of hate speech and propaganda
online inched towards center stage in German politics.39 That same
year, the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection “set
up a ‘task force’ to address the problem.”40 However, by 2016, the
German government was dissatisfied with the providers’ self-regulation.41 The German government resolved that self-regulation had
to be supplemented by government regulation.42 With the goal of
improving the enforcement of existing laws on illegal speech online,
the NEA43 was introduced.44
While this Part is non-conclusive as to the constitutionality of
the NEA, it provides an illustrative look at why the Act is likely
37

Jill Dougherty, The Reality Behind Russia’s Fake News, CNN (Dec. 2,
2016),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/02/politics/russia-fake-news-reality/index.html.
38
See Amol Rajan, Germany Leads Fightback Against Fake News, BBC
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-38991973.
39
Imara McMillan, Enforcement Through the Network: The Network Enforcement Act and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 20
CHI. J. INT’L L. 252, 257–60 (2019).
40
Thomas Wischmeyer, ‘What is Illegal Offline is Also Illegal Online’—The
German Network Enforcement Act 2017, FUNDAMENTAL RTS. PROT. ONLINE:
FUTURE REGUL. INTERMEDIARIES 2 (2019). The task force consisted of representatives from the largest social media companies, including Twitter and Facebook,
who all promised to increase their internal mechanisms to remove illegal posts.
Id. at 2–3.
41
See id. at 4 (citing Press Release, jugendschutz.net, ‘Löschung
rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, YouTube und Twitter’ (Sept. 26,
2016),
https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/News/Artikel/0314
2017_Monitoring_jugendschutz.net.pdf (discussing German Federal Ministry of
Justice and Consumer Protection study of social media providers’ removal of illegal content).
42
See id. at 5.
43
NetzDG, supra note 6, § 3, ¶ 2.
44
McMillan, supra note 39, at 259–60.

580

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:572

constitutional and underscores the contrasts between German Basic
Law and the U.S. Constitution. These differences will be relevant to
a proceeding discussion within this paper about why a similar law
to the NEA would be unconstitutional in the United States.
A.
The Network Enforcement Act
In January 2018, Germany began enforcing a new law called
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, or the NEA,45 which compels social
media platforms to remove any content deemed unlawful within
seven days from the receipt of a complaint.46 The providers also
have twenty-four hours to remove content that is “manifestly unlawful,” after being notified of it.47 The NEA bans specific speech, enumerated in the German Criminal Code,48 including the “[d]issemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional organisations.”49
The entire basis of the Act is to protect citizens from illegal and
harmful speech, including hate speech and “‘fake news’”50 and to
45

Id. at 254; NetzDG, supra note 6, § 6.
NetzDG, supra note 6, § 3, ¶ 2.3.
47
Id. at § 3, ¶ 2.2.
48
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], §§ 86, 86a, 89a, 91, 100a,
111, 126, 129 to 129b, 130, 131, 140, 166, 184b, 184d, 185–187, 201a, 241, 269
(Ger.), translation at https://perma.cc/A6EV-LPWZ (relevant offenses include
the dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional organizations (section 86 STGB), the preparation of a serious violent offence endangering the state
(section § 89a STGB), public incitement to commit a crime (section 111 STGB),
the forming of criminal and terrorist organizations (section 129 to section 129b
STGB), inciting hatred (section 130 STGB), the dissemination of depictions of
violence (section 131 STGB), the defamation of religions, religious and ideological associations (section 166 STGB), the distribution, acquisition, and possession
of child pornography (section 184b and section 184d STGB), insult and defamation (section 185 to 187 STGB), the violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs (section 201a STGB), and threats of committing a felony (section 241
STGB)).
49
Id. at § 86.
50
German Government letter responding to David Kaye, Special Rapporteur
(Aug. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/8K9B-3YC8 (arguing that measures taken
through the NEA were necessary in wake of fake news era, Russian interference
in foreign elections through social media, and rampant radicalization of hate
groups online); see David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Letter to the German
Government (June 1, 2017) (on file with the U.N. at U.N. Doc. OL/DEU/1/2017),
https://perma.cc/7WNL-ML9A.
46
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increase the transparency and responsibility of social media companies regarding technological systems for removing such content.51
The NEA has been criticized for its infringement on free speech
rights,52 yet the German government has staunchly supported the
opposite, stating that the NEA protects German civil rights.53
It is not currently possible to predict how the German courts
might deal with the freedom of expression issues posed by the enactment of the NEA. The German Federal Constitutional Court
(“GFCC”) has not ruled explicitly on the fundamental rights implications of online monitoring.54 The following analysis is, therefore,
hypothetical and based solely on German free speech case law.
However, there are reasons, based on current German freedom of
expression doctrine, to think that the GFCC may uphold the legislation as acceptable.55 First, the German Basic Law has set forth
51

Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Begründung zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken’ (BT-Drs.
18/12356) (May 16, 2017), https://www.computerundrecht.de/1812727.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SLD4-DACA] [Explanatory Memorandum to the Network Enforcement Act] (stating that there is a need to improve law enforcement in social
networks in order to promptly remove objectively criminal content, such as “incitement, insult, defamation, or disruption of public peace by faking offenses”).
52
Josie Le Blond, In Germany, A Battle Against Fake News Stumbles into
Legal Controversy, WORLD POLICY (June 12, 2017), https://worldpolicy.org/2017/06/12/in-germany-a-battle-against-fake-news-stumbles-into-legal-controversy/.
53
See Tough New German Law Puts Tech Firms and Free Speech in Spotlight, IRISH TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/tough-new-german-law-putstech-firms-and-free-speech-in-spotlight-1.3346155 [https://perma.cc/7ZP8-62AZ] (quoting Justice minister Heiko
Maas saying, “‘Incitement to murder, threats, insults and incitement of the masses
or Auschwitz lies are not an expression of freedom of opinion but rather attacks
on the freedom of opinion of others.’”).
54
See Press Release, Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional
Court), Obligation to unlock a Facebook account in temporary legal protection
(May 22, 2019), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Pressemitteilungen/DE/2019/bvg19-038.html (summarizing court’s decision in a
case concerning removal of content by Facebook in compliance with NEA and
subsequent removal of plaintiff’s account, highlighting that it is unclear under
constitutional law whether either of those actions infringe on any basic rights);
BVERFGE, BVQ 42/19 (May 22, 2019), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/e/qk20190522_1bvq004219.html (original decision).
55
See Wischmeyer, supra note 40, at 11–17 (suggesting that the NEA may
be constitutional); infra Part II.B for exploration of German Basic Law.
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explicit limits on free speech.56 Second, false facts receive less, or
even no, protection.57 Third, even protected speech, such as opinions, is subject to a balancing test against other rights.58
B.
German Basic Law
Post-World War II, Germany called for an abandonment of the
previous Nazi regime, and the brutally authoritarian government it
represented.59 The Bonn Constitution, or “Basic Law,”60 created in
1949, aims to create a system of values based on the dignity of human beings, 61 and the concept of individual rights.62 The Basic Law
begins by stating: “[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable. To respect
and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”63 The principal
of human dignity, under the Basic Law, sits at the top of a system of
ordered values.64 This hierarchy is imperative to understanding the
constitutional jurisprudence of Germany.
The hierarchy of values means individual rights such as freedom
of expression are not absolute.65 For instance, human dignity, liberty, preservation of democratic order, democratic integrity, equality, personal inviolability, and physical integrity are all examples of
general values that may be weighed more heavily against the

56

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.1.
58
See infra Part II.C.2.
59
See Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional
Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247, 248 n.1 (1989).
60
[GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7; see Donald P. Kommers, The Basic Law:
A Fifty Year Assessment, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 477, 481 (2000).
61
See BASIL S. MARKESINIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF
TORTS: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 29 (4th ed. 2002) (“A principal aim of the
Constitution of Bonn of 1949 . . . was to establish unequivocally the liberal, social, democratic order of the new state based on the principal of legality.”).
62
Quint, supra note 59, at 249.
63
[GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 1, § 1.
64
See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
305, 321–23 (1999).
65
See DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSEL A MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 442 (3d ed. 2012).
57
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freedom of expression.66 This ordering of values distinguishes German free speech law from its American counterpart.67 Indeed, faced
with a clash, under American free speech jurisprudence, free speech
usually triumphs.68 In sum, the rights enumerated in the Basic Law
must conform to this order of values, with human dignity at its
core.69
C.
The Freedom of Expression in German Basic Law
Article 5 of the Basic Law grants the right of freedom of
speech70 while simultaneously stating that such rights “find their
limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons and in the right to personal honor.”71 It is clear
from these limitations that the freedom of expression is not intended
to be an absolute value.72 Under German jurisprudence, each constitutional right and liberty is interrelated and must be reconciled with
one another.73 Article 5,74 therefore, is subject to explicit limitations
within other general laws,75 but it must also “be reconciled with the
66

[GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 1–4 (These rights are listed and guaranteed in the German Basic Law, which is organized as a hierarchical system of
values.); see ULRICH KARPEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 13 (1988). Additionally, the freedom of expression is not “guaranteed
unlimited” but must be balanced with these other, more highly ranked, rights. Id.
at 93.
67
See Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles Over Free Speech, N.Y. REV.
(June 11, 1992), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1992/06/11/the-coming-battles-over-free-speech/ (“The United States stands alone, even among democracies, in the extraordinary degree to which its [C]onstitution protects freedom of
speech and of the press.”).
68
See infra Part III.B.
69
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 353 (“[These rights enumerated
in the Basic Law] have been proclaimed with an important German twist: they are
to be exercised responsibly and used to foster human dignity within the framework of ordered liberty.”).
70
[GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5, § 1.
71
Id. at art. 5, § 2.
72
See id.
73
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 57.
74
[GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5.
75
See Douglas-Scott, supra note 64, at 321 (“Freedom of expression is an
essential feature of the German Constitution. The free expression provisions of
German Constitutional law, however, interact with measures in the German
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rights and liberties of other persons and groups as well as with other
individuals and social interests recognized by the constitution.”76
Under the Basic Law, in a clash between freedom of expression and
other rights or liberties, freedom of speech may lose.77 German
courts, moreover, must balance78 the right to freedom of expression
with other constitutional rights, such as the right to human dignity
and the preservation of democratic order, to ensure that all values of
the rights in question are properly protected.79 For instance, expressions of opinion are generally protected under the Basic Law.80
However, the “expression of [an] opinion [that] encroaches” on another person’s right to personality or human dignity may not be protected.81
Criminal Code designed to prohibit racist expression in a way that would not be
possible under American law.”).
76
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 442.
77
See Edward J. Eberle, Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 797, 831–32 (1997). In this balancing test, certain speech
is granted more weight than others. In Germany, “[s]peech is valued according to
its utility in promoting desirable ends.” Id. at 805; see infra Part II.C.2 (discussing
cases in German jurisprudence where other basic rights were upheld over right to
free expression).
78
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 66 (discussing the balancing
objective of German Constitutional analysis).
79
See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Jan. 15, 1958, 7 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 198 (Ger.) ] [hereinafter Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198] [https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=51, translated in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at
443–44. Rather than interpreting Lüth’s Article 5 right to free speech and deciding
the case based on those constitutional merits alone, the Court balanced whether
the speech infringed on any constitutional interests of Harlan, the moving party,
or violated any protections provided under “‘general laws.’” Id. at 447. The Court
rejected the argument that complainant should have refrained from “boycotting
out of regard for Harlan’s professional interests and economic interests.” Id. at
448. While the free speech claim in the Lüth case technically won, the Federal
Constitution Court nonetheless established that constitutional interests in speech
must be balanced with “‘general laws’” that represent community or individual
interests. See Quint, supra note 59, at 286 (discussing balancing test established
in Lüth).
80
Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198, supra note 79, translated in KOMMERS & MILLER,
supra note 65, at 445 (“The basic right to freedom of opinion, as the most immediate expression of the human personality living in society, is one of the noblest
of human rights.”).
81
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 446.
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Certain speech, moreover, is excepted from constitutional protection altogether: expressions that threaten the democratic social
order,82 violence,83 speech that undermines human dignity (e.g.,
“hate speech” as we know it in the United States),84 group defamation, and incitement.85 In contrast, American constitutional law protects speech advocating illegal conduct,86 hate speech,87 and lies.88
In cases against government regulation under German law, an
interference with the freedom of expression can be justified by the
provisions of general laws, provisions for the protection of young
persons, or the right to personal honor.89 It is important to note that,
while the Basic Law places statutory limits on the freedom of
82

Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar.
7, 1990, 81 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE]
278 (Ger.), translated in German Case: Bundesflagge Decision, Foreign Law
Translations, https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=632 (“The flag serves as an important integration device
through the leading state goals it embodies; its disparagement can thus impair the
necessary authority of the state.”).
83
See id. (finding the legislature can pass laws preventing children from gaining access to materials that glorify violence or crime, provoke racial hatred, glorify war, or depict sexual acts in a crude, offensive, and shameful manner).
84
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 471 (“Thus, freedom of opinion
must always take second place where the statement actually affects another’s human dignity.”) (quoting Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1995, 93 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS
[BVerfGE] 266 (Ger.)).
85
See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court],
Apr. 13, 1994, 90, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS
[BVerfGE] 241 (Ger.), [hereinafter Holocaust Denial 90 BVerfGE 241], translated in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 493–97.
86
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (holding
that Brandenburg did not incite or produce imminent lawless action by making a
speech at a KKK rally and, therefore, Ohio statute criminalizing syndicalism violated Brandenburg’s First Amendment rights).
87
See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (“The First Amendment
does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who
express views on disfavored subjects.”).
88
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) (constitutional protection
does not turn upon “the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs
which are offered”).
89
[GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5, § 2 (“These rights shall find their
limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young
persons, and in the right to personal honor.”).
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expression, the limits themselves have limits.90 There are differing
academic opinions when it comes to defining a “general law.”91
However, Germany’s highest court, the GFCC, has determined that
a general law is not a law that seeks to prohibit the articulation of an
opinion, but rather, its main function is to protect or promote a legally protected interest.92
The GFCC must determine the proportionality of the regulation
in relation to the rights at issue.93 Under this principal, the basic
rights of German citizens may only be limited if the government restriction is the only means of achieving the specified aims.94 This
“principal of proportionality consists of three requirements.”95 The
first requirement is suitability.96 The restriction, in other words,
must be able to actually “achieve the purpose intended.”97 The next
requirement is necessity, or otherwise known as “least interference.”98 Under this element, the restriction is only valid if it is shown
that there are no other means to efficiently accomplish the same aims
without the interference.99 Lastly, the restriction must be

90

See SABINE MICHALOWSKI & LORNA WOODS, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 81–83 (1999).
91
See Mehrdad Payandeh, The Limits of Freedom of Expression in the Wunsiedel Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 11 GER. L.J. 929,
932–33 (2010) (discussing different interpretations of “general law” by German
scholars).
92
See id. at 929, 932 (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court], Nov. 4, 2009, 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUN
GSGERICHTS [BVerfGE]).
93
See MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 90, at 81–83. The Court also
looks to other requirements to determine if a regulation will survive constitutional
scrutiny: (1) the restriction must not be of the “essential character[istics] of a basic
right”; (2) the restriction cannot be aimed at individual cases; (3) the restriction
“must expressly name” the basic right seeking to be limited; (4) there must be
legal certainty; and (5) the restriction must adhere to the principal of proportionality. See id. However, proportionality is the most relevant to this Note.
94
Id. at 83.
95
Id. at 83–84.
96
Id. at 83.
97
Id.
98
See MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 90, at 83.
99
See id.
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appropriate.100 To determine the appropriateness of the restriction,
the GFCC balances the right being limited with the interest being
pursued.101
This analysis is very similar to strict scrutiny in the United
States;102 however, based on the order of values within the Basic
Law, it seems German Courts are more willing to accept a government interest as compelling. Overall, the right to freedom of expression in Germany is not absolute and can be limited by “general laws”
and must also be weighed with other rights granted under the constitution.
1. WHAT KIND OF SPEECH IS PROTECTED?
In freedom of expression cases, the German courts must first determine whether a speech is protected under the Basic Law or falls
into an exception, e.g., speech of such low value that it is not covered.103 The GFCC, given the language of Article 5, has had to determine whether the freedom of expression under Article 5(1) protects only opinions, or whether other speech, such as the expression
of mere fact, especially false facts, deserves constitutional protection as well.104 The GFCC has established that opinions are protected, regardless of their content.105 Statements of fact, on the other
hand, are distinguished from opinions.106 This approach is strikingly
different from American constitutional law, where lies or “false
fact” still retain full First Amendment protection.107
This distinction between opinions and false facts is evident in
the Auschwitz Lie case where the German Court imposed a prior
100

Id. at 84.
See id.; infra Part C.II.2 (discussing cases in German jurisprudence where
these rights are balanced).
102
See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing strict scrutiny).
103
See supra notes 71–80.
104
See MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 90, at 200–03.
105
See Holocaust Denial 90 BVerfGE 241, supra note 85, translated in
KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 493. (stating that opinions are protected
by the basic right of art. 5(1)(1)).
106
See id. at 493–94 (distinguishing a statement of fact from opinion).
107
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206–07 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a
Neo-Nazi march purposely held in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood was
protected speech and finding an anti-defamation law by which the Village sought
to prevent the march invalid).
101
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restraint of a demonstration in support of Holocaust denial.108 The
demonstrators alleged that the court’s decision violated their right to
exercise their opinions under Article 5.109 The court asserted that the
freedom of opinion, like all rights to speech, are subject to limitations under Article 5(2).110 These limitations are imposed by statute,
and a balancing test is conducted to weigh the basic right with the
legal interest that the statute serves.111 There, the court reasoned that
the demonstration was based on a clearly false fact112—that the Holocaust never occurred113—and, therefore, deserved far less constitutional protection.114
2. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND BALANCING
Next, in cases where the freedom of expression clashes with
other Basic Law rights, the court must engage in a balancing test
108

See Holocaust Denial, 90 BVerfGE 241, supra note 85, translated in
KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 495 (stating that opinions are protected by
the basic right of art. 5(1)(1)). This case also highlights an important distinction
between American and German freedom of expression jurisprudence: hate speech
is not protected under German Basic Law, whereas it is protected speech under
the American constitution. See Douglas-Scott, supra note 64, at 324–27 (discussing the Court’s decision to place an injunction on the conference due to its threatened breaches of sections 130 (incitement to hatred) and 185 (insult) of the criminal code); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam) (requiring that violence be imminent before hateful speech may be proscribed).
109
See Holocaust Denial, 90 BVerfGE 241, supra note 85, translated in
KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 493.
110
See Holocaust Denial, 90 BVerfGE 241, supra note 85, translated in
KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 495–96; see also [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5, § 2.
111
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing this balancing test).
112
See Douglas-Scott, supra note 64, at 326–27. However, the Court also established that even if the statements in question “were merely opinions rather than
statements of [false] fact,” the “protection of personal identity over freedom of
expression” would still be warranted. See id.
113
See Holocaust Denial, 90 BVerfGE 241, supra note 85, translated in
KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 495 (“[Holocaust denial] is a representation of fact that is demonstrably untrue in the light of in-numerable eye-witness
accounts, documents, findings of courts in numerous criminal cases, and historical
analysis.”).
114
Id. at 496 (“When insulting opinions that contain representations of fact
are voiced, it is crucial whether the representations of fact are true or untrue. Demonstrably incorrect representations of fact do not merit protection.”).

2021]

THE COST OF FREE SPEECH

589

between the rights at issue.115 One of the most foundational cases in
German jurisprudence is the Lüth case, which established the doctrine of an objective order of values and identified standards to be
applied by courts in weighing the rights of speech and other basic
rights.116 The dispute in Lüth was “between Erich Lüth, a minor official in Hamburg, and Veit Harlan, a former director of racist films
under the Nazis.”117 In 1950, “Harlan directed his first post-war
movie, Immortal Beloved.”118 “Lüth called for a boycott of Harlan’s
new film,”119 and Harlan sought an injunction against Lüth that
would prohibit Lüth from issuing further calls for a boycott of the
film.120 Finding that Lüth’s statements injured the plaintiffs’ business, the state court issued an injunction prohibiting Lüth from promoting any more boycotts of Harlan’s film.121 “In response, Lüth
filed a ‘constitutional complaint’ in the Federal Constitutional
Court,” stating the injunction violated his Article 5(1) right to free
expression.122
The GFCC ruled that Lüth’s constitutional rights were indeed
infringed upon.123 However, through this ruling, the GFCC established pivotal interpretations of Article 5.124 For one, it solidified the
Basic Law as a hierarchy of values.125 The GFCC held that the lower
courts had failed to give the basic value of free speech the proper
weight when balancing the right to freedom of expression with the
115
See Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198, supra note 79, translated in KOMMERS &
MILLER, supra note 65, at 444.
116
See id. (“[T]he Basic Law is not a value-neutral document. Its section on
basic rights establishes an objective order of values, and this order strongly reinforces the effective power of basic rights.”)
117
See Quint, supra note 59, at 252–53 and accompanying footnotes (discussing Lüth).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 253–54.
121
See Quint, supra note 59, at 253–54.
122
Id. at 254.
123
Id.; see Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198, supra note 79, translated in KOMMERS &
MILLER, supra note 65, at 448.
124
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 449.
125
See Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198, supra note 79, translated in KOMMERS &
MILLER, supra note 65, at 443–44 (stating that main purpose of basic rights is to
protect individual against encroachment of public power and that Basic Law
erects an objective order of values of basic rights).
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plaintiff’s private rights.126 The GFCC rejected the argument that
Harlan’s human dignity was infringed upon,127 and the balancing
test weighed in favor of Lüth’s free speech rights.128 While the free
speech claim in Lüth technically won, the GFCC, nonetheless, established that free speech rights had to be balanced against other
conflicting rights based on their overall objective values within society.129
Lebach is another important case in German jurisprudence
showcasing the GFCC’s balancing test, and how free speech rights
can be overridden by other rights. 130 In Lebach, the GFCC upheld
an injunction against the showing of a documentary television film
about a famous robbery of a government ammunitions depot.131 The
documentary referred to the conspirators by name, described the
heist with specific facts and accuracy, and highlighted the intimate
relationship between the male conspirators.132 The documentary was
to be aired a few years after the robbery and just before the plaintiff
prisoner’s release.133
Despite the accuracy of the film, the court ruled in favor of the
bank robbers.134 It is important to note that the documentary “was
not claimed to contain false statements.”135 Rather, the court
126

See id. at 448 (“[T]he regional court, in assessing the behavior of the complainant, has misjudged the special significance of the basic right to freedom of
opinion.”).
127
See Quint, supra note 59, at 286 and accompanying footnotes (discussing
GFCC’s finding in Lüth that infringement on Harlan’s human dignity could only
be shown if it was completely excluded from his profession).
128
See Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198, supra note 79, translated in KOMMERS &
MILLER, supra note 65, at 448.
129
See Quint, supra note 59, at 286 (discussing the Lüth case and the analysis
the German Constitutional Court implemented to balance two constitutional values).
130
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], June
5, 1973, 35, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE]
202 (Ger.), [hereinafter Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202] [https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=62], translated in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at
479–83.
131
Id. at 479–80, 483.
132
Id. at 480.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 483.
135
See Quint, supra note 59, at 300 (discussing the German Constitutional
Court’s analysis in the Lebach case).

2021]

THE COST OF FREE SPEECH

591

emphasized the prisoner’s right to human dignity under Article 1
and freedom of personality under Article 2 of the Basic Law.136 The
court interpreted that those rights afforded a person to determine
whether and to what extent others might be permitted to portray his
life story in general, or certain events from his life.137 In other words,
this right to personality may be equated with privacy rights in the
United States.138 The rights of free reporting under Article 5, Section
1 were then balanced with these rights to human dignity and personality.139 The court emphasized the importance of the freedom of the
press while also reiterating the limitations of this freedom.140 After
balancing each constitutional right at issue, the court determined that
the prisoner’s right to be free from invasion into his personality,
even by true statements, outweighed the right to free reporting.141
The outcome of Lebach compared to Lüth highlights the impact
of the balancing of rights. Both cases show that depending on the
weight given to free expression versus human dignity, or other competing rights, the law may be speech-restrictive or speech-protective. In Lebach, it is clear the court valued human dignity and personality rights over those of free speech142—a trend in German jurisprudence beginning with Lüth and continuing today.143 This emphasis on human dignity exposes the wide range of judicial
136

See Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202, supra note 130, translated in KOMMERS &
MILLER, supra note 65, at 481.
137
See id. at 480. This right, while enumerated in the Basic Law, also rests, in
part, on a general law that creates a qualified right to control one’s own “picture.”
See Quint, supra note 59, at 300 n.173 (citing KUNSTURHEBERGESETZ [KUG]
(German copyright law) §§ 22, 23).
138
See Quint, supra note 59, at 279–80.
139
See id.
140
See Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202, supra note 130, translated in KOMMERS &
MILLER, supra note 65, at 481 (discussing importance of the freedom of the press,
but also its limitations when at odds with other rights enumerated under Basic
Law).
141
See id. at 483. A factor in the Court’s determination was that the particular
broadcast was to be made years after the initial robbery and, therefore, lost any
urgency and importance in informing the public of a significant event. Id. at 482.
Whereas the prisoner’s right to develop his personality and reintegrate into society
after his release would be severely compromised by such a damaging and exposing documentary. Id. at 482–83.
142
See Quint, supra note 59, at 299–300.
143
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 442.
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decisions possible when the values of certain rights are weighed
against one another.144
The Mephisto case similarly reveals the court’s evolution towards greater emphasis on human dignity rights over communicative ones.145 In a famous 3-3 split,146 the court effectively upheld an
injunction against publication of a novel about a deceased actor.147
The novel, written by Klauss Mann, was based on Gustaf
Gründgens, a famous actor during Nazi control of Germany, and director of the Prussian State Theatre.148 The main character in the
novel, Hendrik Höfgen, made his name by playing the devil in Goethe’s “Faust” during the Nazi period and furthered his career by siding with those in power in Nazi Germany.149 Despite Mann’s disclaimer in the forward of the book stating that all characters represented general types and not portraits of specific persons, the court
found that the novel defamed the memory of Gründgens, because
Höfgen, the character in the novel, paralleled the details of
Gründgen’s career and life.150 In this case, unlike the previous two
cases, the right at issue was the right to artistic freedom, under Article 5(3) of the Basic Law.151 While Article 5(3) is not subject to the
same explicit limitations as the freedom of expression under Article
5(2),152 the court established that artistic freedoms are in fact subject
to limitations.153 The court emphasizes that the right to artistic freedom cannot be limited by statute—as the communicative rights can

144

See id.
See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court],
Feb. 24, 1971, 30, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUN
GSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 173 (Ger.) [hereinafter Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173]
[https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=56], translated in KOMMERS &
MILLER, supra note 65, at 519–22.
146
See Federal Constitutional Court Law (BVerfGG) § 15(4). Under German
law, a tie vote results in the lower court ruling remaining in effect. Id.
147
See Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173, supra note 145.
148
Quint, supra note 59, at 291.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 291–92.
151
See id.; [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5, § 3.
152
[GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5, §§ 2, 3.
153
Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173, supra note 145, translated in KOMMERS &
MILLER, supra note 65, at 520 (establishing that the right of artistic liberty is not
unlimited).
145
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be—but are limited by the Constitution itself.154 Therefore, the right
to artistic freedom is balanced with the right to human dignity and
personality rights,155 enumerated under Article 1 of the Basic
Law.156 Both Mephisto and Lebach highlight the court’s emphasis
on human dignity and personality rights when in conflict with other
rights or values, specifically the right to free expression.157
Speech in Germany is valued in accordance with its promulgating of desirable ends for society, such as public or political speech,
art, academic research, and scientific communication.158 However,
the right to free speech is not unlimited, and if speech conflicts with
any other constitutionally appointed rights, it will be analyzed based
on its benefit to society in contrast to the conflicting right.159 Overall, German doctrine differs from the U.S. doctrine in two important
ways. First, there are far more “exceptions” to the freedom of expression in Germany, because of the statutory limits written directly
into the Basic Law.160 In the United States, exceptions to protected
speech are rare and very limited.161 Second, because the rights listed
under the Basic Law are objectively ordered,162 the GFCC employs
a balancing test when differing rights and interests are at issue.163
Freedom of expression is typically given less weight in this balance,

154

Id. at 520–21.
See id. (establishing that if the guarantee of artistic freedom gives rise to
any conflict, it must be resolved by construction in terms of the order of values
enshrined in the Basic Law).
156
[GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 1.
157
See Quint, supra note 59, at 300, 307 (discussing both holdings in Mephisto
and Lebach).
158
See Eberle, supra note 77, at 800 (stating that “[s]peech [in Germany] is
valued according to its utility in promoting desirable ends”); see also Mephisto,
30 BVerfGE 173, supra note 145, translated in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note
65, at 520; [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5, § 2.
159
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 66.
160
See [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 1, §§ 1, 2, 5.
161
See infra notes 215–19.
162
See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 66 (discussing the balancing
objective of German Constitutional analysis).
163
See supra Part II.C.2 for a discussion of the Court’s use of this balancing
test.
155
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whereas in the United States, freedom of speech is arguably valued
above all other rights.164
III.
AMERICAN FREE SPEECH LAW
This Part will explore the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, specifically, free speech jurisprudence and theories,
and analyze whether a statute, like the Network Enforcement Act,
would be constitutional in the United States. Compared to the analysis of German Basic Law, above, U.S. free speech laws are extremely stringent and do not provide much flexibility when it comes
to government regulation of fake news.
A.
The First Amendment
The First Amendment to the Constitution states that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech; or of the
press . . . .”165 Note that there are no explicit limitations written into
the text.166 Already, there is a stark contrast between German freedom of expression and U.S. free speech.167 This distinction will illustrate why free speech under U.S. jurisprudence is protected more
often than its German counterpart.
There are four main theories used by the Supreme Court to justify protection of the First Amendment: (1) the promotion of the
marketplace of ideas;168 (2) the promotion of democratic self164

See Brian C. Castello, The Voice of Government as an Abridgement of First
Amendment Rights of Speakers: Rethinking Meese v. Keene, 1989 DUKE L.J. 654,
654 (1989) (“By proscribing that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . ,’ the first amendment makes an unequivocal statement that
accords with the traditional view of freedom of expression, and significantly restricts the government’s power to act directly against individual expression.”);
Rebecca Zipursky, Nuts about NETZ: The Network Enforcement Act and Freedom of Expression, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1325, 1343 (2019) (“America has a
famously robust conception of free speech. While the first right protected in the
German Basic Law is human dignity, the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights
protects the freedom to speak.”).
165
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
166
See id.
167
See supra Part II.C.2.
168
See Clay Calvert et al., Fake News and the First Amendment: Reconciling
a Disconnect Between Theory and Doctrine, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 99, 124–25 (2018)
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government;169 (3) the promotion of individual autonomy, self-expression, and self-realization;170 and (4) a negative theory that promulgates the idea that the citizens of the United States do not trust the
government to regulate speech.171
The marketplace of ideas theory is frequently used by courts to
resolve free speech cases.172 Under this theory, it is thought that we
can best uncover truth and advance knowledge by allowing all ideas,
opinions, and viewpoints to flow freely in the marketplace.173 The
(“[T]he marketplace of ideas model . . . originates in John Milton’s 1644 Areopagitica.” John Stuart Mill then elaborated on the marketplace of ideals model over
200 years later in On Liberty.”); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR
THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING 69 (H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co,
Ltd. 1959) (1644) (ebook) (“And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose
to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and
prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”); JOHN STUART MILL
& JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, ON LIBERTY 118 (David Bromwich, & George Kateb,
Yale University Press 2003) (1859) (ebook), available at ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/miami/detail.action?docID=3420105.
The term “marketplace of ideas,” as we know it today, however, began its development with Justice Holmes’ “free trade in ideas,” which was then adapted by
Justice Brennan into “marketplace of ideas.” See David Cole, Agon at Agora:
Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 891
(1986) (noting the importance of the Court’s increasing use of Justice Brennan’s
phrase “marketplace of ideas” rather than Holmes’ “free trade in ideas.”); Christoph Bezemek, The Epistemic Neutrality of the “Marketplace of Ideas”: Milton,
Mill, Brandeis, and Holmes on Falsehood and Freedom of Speech, 14 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 159, 173 (2015) (asserting that “[t]he influence Milton and Mill
had on Holmes’s thought cannot be denied”).
169
See
ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL
FREEDOM:
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 75 (1960) (“The primary purpose of
the First Amendment is . . . that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand
the issues which bear upon our common life. That is why no idea, no opinion, no
doubt, no belief, no counter-belief, no relevant information, may be kept from
them. Under the compact upon which the Constitution rests, it is agreed that men
shall not be governed by others, that they shall govern themselves.”).
170
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875,
881 (1994).
171
See Kraski, supra note 1, at 930.
172
See Calvert, supra note 168, at 124 nn.184–85 (discussing marketplace of
ideas theory in contemporary Supreme Court case law (citing W. Wat Hopkins,
The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS
COMM. Q. 40, 47 (1996))).
173
See id. at 124.
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second theory, the promotion of democratic self-government, promulgates the idea that the free flow of information helps us to vote
wisely by providing complete access to knowledge and opinions to
inform our own votes.174 Like the marketplace theory, this theory
emphasizes the free flow of information.175 Third, the theory of free
speech as the promotion of individual autonomy and self-expression
also propagates the idea that freedom of speech helps develop individual expression and “self-realization.”176 In other words, freedom
of speech is necessary for a person to develop personality and to,
thus, make informed life decisions.177 The last, most important value
justifying the right to guaranteed freedom of expression is the innate
aversion to government oversight.178 Underlying many decisions to
uphold free speech—such as protecting hate speech or lies—is the
notion that the social cost of any form of government censorship will
invariably exceed the benefit of regulating the arguably harmful
speech.179 As Justice Kennedy wrote in United States v. Alvarez:
“[o]ur constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need
Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”180 The Supreme Court and scholars

174

Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP.
CT. REV. 245, 254–55 (1961) (“Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence . . . that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.”); see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (2000); see also Calvert, supra note 168, at 131.
175
See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT, supra note 174, at 25 (using a metaphor of a town meeting to illustrate theory that “[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that
everything worth saying shall be said”); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an
Absolute, supra note 174, at 257.
176
See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978) (stating that free speech should be protected because it “fosters self-realization” and “self-determination”).
177
See id.
178
See Kraski, supra note 1, at 930.
179
See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Questioning the Value of Dissent and Free
Speech More Generally: American Skepticism of Government and the Protection
of Low-Value Speech, in DISSENTING VOICES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE ROLE
OF JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND CITIZENS 221–22 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012).
180
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (citing G. ORWELL,
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949) (Centennial ed. 2003)).
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alike have supported and relied upon all of these theories to develop
modern Free Speech doctrine. 181
B.
Free Speech Jurisprudence
When presented with a First Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court will engage in a certain analysis. First, the Court will
determine whether the speech at issue is protected under the First
Amendment.182 Under modern free speech doctrine, not all categories of speech are worthy of protection.183 The Court has determined
that certain categories of speech provide such little social value, and
also cause so much harm, that there is no benefit in protecting
them.184 For example, obscenity, child pornography, speech that incites imminent lawless action, and fighting words do not deserve
protection.185 The Supreme Court has also declined to add new
181

See R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine:
Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Review, and Reasonableness Balancing, 8 ELON L.
REV. 291, 291 (2016). This Note also defines the term “modern” as “beginning
with the Warren Court in 1954.” Id.
182
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
183
See id. (establishing a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech
may not be prohibited if it “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action” and (2) it “is likely to incite or produce such action.”); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (holding that obscene material is not protected by the
First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–83 (1964)
(providing substantial protection for speech about public figures, but not defamatory speech); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)
(holding that “the constitutional freedom of speech and press extends its immunity
to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid
criminal statute”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)
(establishing that words causing a direct harm to their target and could be construed to advocate an immediate breach of the peace are “‘fighting words’” and
are not protected by the First Amendment); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
756–64 (1982) (finding a statute targeted against child pornography does not violate First Amendment); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per
curiam) (holding that a “political hyperbole” is not a “true ‘threat’” and is thus
protected by the First Amendment).
184
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem . . . . It has been well observed that such utterances . . . are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.”).
185
See Kelso, supra note 181, at 324; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–64.
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categories of speech to this list.186 Overall, modern free speech doctrine protects unpopular ideas187 and offensive modes of expression188—even lies.189
Once the Court determines whether the speech at issue is protected or falls under one of the categories listed above, the Court

186

See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (declining to add
lies as a new excepted category of speech).
187
See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 271, 273. In N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, an Alabama
jury returned a verdict against the New York Times in favor of a police commissioner who claimed he was libeled by an advertisement. Id. at 256. The advertisement protested the police department’s treatment of civil rights workers, including
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and stated that Mr. King was arrested seven times,
when in fact he had been arrested four. Id. at 259. The Alabama court found this
misstatement of fact was sufficient to establish a claim for libel. Id. at 262. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s application of libel law unduly inhibited public discourse. Id. at 264. Justice Brennan, who is thought to be
the chief architect of modern free speech doctrine, stated that “debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.” Id. at 270; see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (reversing conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader for violating a state statute that outlawed advocacy of violence or terrorism as a means
of political reform). The Court in Brandenburg established that a person cannot
be punished for advocacy of violent activity unless it creates direct incitement or
“imminent lawless action.” Id. at 447. The Supreme Court’s decisions in N.Y.
Times and Brandenburg impose strict Frist Amendment safeguards.
188
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–26 (1971) (5-4 decision) (extending
strong First Amendment protection to the use of language or symbols that society
finds offensive). In Cohen, a young antiwar protester was convicted of breach of
the peace for wearing a jacket emblazoned with the message “‘Fuck the Draft.’”
Id. at 16. Speaking for the majority, Justice Harlan wrote that Cohen is protected
by the Constitution from “arbitrary government interference” and that the government has no power to regulate the “substantive message” Cohen wishes to convey.
Id. at 19. The Court also emphasized that not all speech is given “absolute protection,” but that the current case is “not an obscenity case” which requires specifically “erotic,” “obscene expression.” Id. at 19–20. Nor is it an incitement to violence case. Id. at 22–23. Similarly, in Texas v. Johnson, the Court again protected
the use of symbols by establishing that there is a Constitutional right to burn an
American flag as a form of political protest. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418
(1989) (5-4 decision).
189
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 727 (“The response to the unreasoned, the rationale; to the uniformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple
truth”).
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then determines which level of review to apply.190 The level of review will depend on whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral.191 If there is any content-based192 regulation by the government, the Court will use strict scrutiny review.193
In sum, two aspects of modern free speech doctrine that are important for this Note are: (1) content-based regulations of speech are
reviewed using strict scrutiny,194 and (2) unless speech falls into an
existing excepted category, it will be given first amendment protection.195 The next sub-Parts will explore both points and illustrate
why most speech regulations subject to strict scrutiny fail.
1. STRICT SCRUTINY
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence places a high value on Free
Speech.196 Any content-based regulation of speech is presumed

190
There are other factors, while not relevant to this Note but are still important to note, that a court will look to when determining which level of review
to apply. See Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 883, 908 (1991). For instance, if the speech at issue took place in a public
forum or private-individual property, and there is content-based regulation consisting of either viewpoint discrimination or subject matter discrimination, the
Court will use strict scrutiny review. Id. In general, content-based restrictions on
speech—laws that “appl[y] to particular speech because of the topic discussed or
the idea or message expressed”—are presumptively unconstitutional and subject
to strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). Additionally, if the regulation is content-neutral, the Court will use an intermediate review.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
790–91 (4th ed. 2011) (ebook) (“Under intermediate scrutiny, a law is upheld if
it is substantially related to an important government purpose.”).
191
See Kelso, supra note 181, at 293, 295.
192
Reed, 576 U.S. at 172–73 (holding that a town’s Sign Code was contentbased regulation because rules within code applied specifically to messages of the
sign).
193
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 190, at 791 (“Under strict scrutiny, a law
will be upheld if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.”).
194
See supra Part III.B.1.
195
See Kelso, supra note 181, at 324; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–
64 (1982); Part III.B.2.
196
See Dworkin, supra note 67 (“The United States stands alone even among
democracies, in the extraordinary degree to which its [C]onstitution protects freedom of speech and of the press.”).
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unconstitutional.197 The Court, therefore, reviews government interference under strict scrutiny.198 The burden is placed on the government to overcome strict scrutiny by proving that the regulation at
issue advances compelling or overriding government ends and is
narrowly tailored to advance those ends.199
As an initial matter, to overcome strict scrutiny, the government
must prove that the content-based regulations were enacted to further a compelling purpose.200 The Court has found that the following
interests are sufficiently compelling: protecting the integrity of the
voting system,201 protecting against discrimination of women202 or
197
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (“Contentbased regulations are presumptively invalid.”); see also Police Dep’t of the City
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (Court established unconstitutionality of content-based regulation). In Mosley, the question before the Court was
whether a state law banning all peaceful picketing outside of a high school except
for labor dispute protests, violated the First Amendment. Id. at 93–94. The Court
stated that the ordinance “describ[ed] permissible picketing in terms of its subject
matter,” and that the government has “no power to restrict expression because of
its message.” Id. at 95. The ordinance, rather than describing picketing as impermissible because of time, place, or circumstance, stipulated certain picketing as
illegal based on the message’s content. Id. The distinguishing of general peaceful
picketing from labor picketing, therefore, restricts speech in an unconstitutional
way. Id. The Court further emphasized that “[s]elective exclusions from a public
forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference
to content alone.” Id. at 96.
198
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–
29 (1995) (“[T]he government may not regulate speech based on its substantive
content or the message it conveys.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 190, at 791–92.
199
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 190, at 791–92 (“Under strict the government has the burden of proof. That is, the law will be struck down unless the
government can show that the law is necessary to accomplish a compelling government purpose.”)
200
Sable Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in
order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest.”). See CHARLES D. KELSO & R. RANDALL KELSO,
THE PATH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1101–02 (2007) (e-treatise), https://libguides.stcl.edu/ld.php?content_id=36280424.
201
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196–98 (1992) (finding that a statute
restricting the areas around voting polling places is necessary to serve the interest
in protecting the right to vote freely and effectively).
202
See Bd. of Dirs. v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (holding that the
interest in eradicating discrimination against women and assuring that women
have access to business contacts is sufficiently “compelling”).
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promoting gender equality,203 protecting the well-being of children,204 and protecting captive audiences from offensive communication.205 In contrast, the Court has found the following interests not
to be compelling: promoting respect for the American flag206 and
protecting a non-captive audience from being offended.207
The second element necessary to overcome strict scrutiny is to
show that the regulation is absolutely necessary to achieve the desired end.208 The government must prove, therefore, that there are
no alternative, less restrictive means to further its compelling interest.209 For instance, in Boos v. Barry,210 the government regulation
at issue was a prohibition on the display of any sign within 500 feet
of a foreign embassy if that sign tended to bring that foreign government into “‘public odium’” or “‘public disrepute.’”211 The Court
found that the law at issue was unnecessarily restrictive, because
there was an equally effective yet less speech-restrictive law212 already passed by Congress. The alternative law effectively protected
foreign diplomats from harassing behavior213 while not infringing

203

See Roberts v. United States, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (finding “that Minnesota’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact” of a state statute on a male members’ association).
204
See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., 492 U.S. at 126 (“[T]here is a compelling
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.”).
205
See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (“The State’s interest in
protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the
highest order in a free and civilized society.”).
206
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 387, 418 (1989); see also United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 308, 311 (1990).
207
See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 530, 533–34 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211–
12 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–26 (1971).
208
See Sable Communications of Cal., 492 U.S. at 126. The Court sometimes
uses “narrowly tailored” or “carefully tailored” as synonyms for “necessary.” Id.
209
See id.
210
See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
211
See id. at 316 (quoting D.C. Code § 22–1115 (1981 ed.)).
212
See id. at 312; 18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2).
213
See Boos, 485 U.S. at 325 (“§112 was developed as a deliberate effort to
implement our international obligations.”). The law subjects to criminal punishment willful acts or attempts to “‘intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass a foreign
official or an official guest or obstruct a foreign official in the performance of his
duties.’” Id. at 325–26 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2)).
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on free speech rights.214 The government failed to show why this
alternative, less restrictive law was insufficient as an alternative to
the one at issue.215
2. LIES AND HATE SPEECH ARE AFFORDED FREE SPEECH
PROTECTION
As a general rule, the First Amendment protects “all forms of
communication.”216 As mentioned earlier, there are a few exceptions
to this rule: obscenity, child pornography, speech that incites imminent lawless action, and fighting words, are all outside First Amendment protection.217 Lies, hate speech, and propaganda are not included in this list.218 In 2012, the Supreme Court established, in Alvarez,219 that there is no general First Amendment exception for
false statements and declined to create a new category for them.220
The plaintiff, Xavier Alvarez, announced in a speech that he received the Congressional Medal of Honor when in fact he did not.221
Alvarez was then indicted under the Stolen Valor Act (the “Act”),
which made it illegal to lie about receiving military decorations or
medals.222 Having established that false speech fell under the

214

See id. at 326 (“First and foremost, § 112 is not narrowly directed at the
content of speech but at any activity, including speech, that has the prohibited
effects. Moreover, § 112, unlike § 22–1115, does not prohibit picketing; it only
prohibits activity undertaken to ‘intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass.’” (citing
18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2))).
215
Id. at 321, 324, 327.
216
Tinker v. Des Moines: What is Symbolic Speech? When is it Protected?,
LANDMARK CASES, https://www.landmarkcases.org/tinker-v-des-moines/tinkerv-des-moines-what-is-symbolic-speech-when-is-it-protected.
217
See Kelso, supra note 181, at 324; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–
64 (1982).
218
See Kelso, supra note 181, at 324; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–64. In contrast,
the GFCC has recognized that these same categories of speech fall outside the
purview of Basic Law protection when their use interferes with other enumerated
rights. See supra Part II.
219
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
220
See id. at 718 (“Absent from those few categories where the law allows
content-based regulation of speech is any general exception to the First Amendment for false statements.”).
221
Id. at 713.
222
Id. at 713–14.
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protection of the First Amendment,223 the Court concluded that the
law must be examined under strict scrutiny.224 To satisfy its burden,
the government argued that the Act was similar to other constitutional restrictions on false statements, including false statements
made to a government official, perjury, and falsely representing a
government official.225 The Court rejected this argument, stating
that the listed examples, unlike the Act, each carry a higher purpose
than a general restriction on false statements.226 The government,
moreover, failed to show that the Act implemented the least restrictive means to achieving this end.227 For instance, the government
did not show why lesser restrictive means, such as refutation of the
false statement or an online database of Medal of Honor winners,
are not more appropriate.228
Additionally, as the Court made clear in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, hate speech remains protected under the First Amendment.229
In R.A.V., the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that
banned the display of any symbol that “one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.”230 Delivering the
opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia emphasized that, while burning
a cross may be categorized as “fighting words,” an unprotected category of speech,231 the statute was still unconstitutional because it
represented impermissible viewpoint discrimination.232 While the
223
See id. at 719 (“The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government advances: that false statements receive no First Amendment protection.”).
224
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724.
225
Id. at 719–20.
226
See id. at 721.
227
See id. at 728.
228
See id. at 729.
229
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
230
Id. at 380 (quoting S. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul,
Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)). The statute specifically banned: the display
of “‘a burning cross[,] or Nazi swastika, [or other symbol] which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.’” Id.
231
Id. at 393.
232
See id. at 391. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court established that violence
must be imminent before hateful speech may be proscribed. See Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).

604

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:572

burning of the cross fell into an unprotected category of speech, the
statute was still discriminating only against hateful viewpoints
within the unprotected category.233 In other words, the government
cannot discriminate against viewpoint-based hate speech even
within an unprotected category.234 The decision highlights the
Court’s unwillingness to place hate speech into an existing category
of unprotected speech.
Years later, in Virginia v. Black,235 the Court actually upheld a
Virginia ordinance outlawing cross burnings done with the intent to
intimidate.236 Rather than overturning R.A.V., the Black Court distinguished the case at hand by finding that the Virginia statute at
issue applied without regard to the viewpoint of the cross burner.237
The Court, therefore, classified the burning of a cross with the intent
to intimidate as a “true threat,” a category of speech not protected
under the First Amendment.238 As it stands, under R.A.V., and still
under Black, hate speech is afforded First Amendment protection,
unless it can be shown to be a “true threat.”239
Unless the Supreme Court recognizes propaganda as an unprotected category of speech, it too falls under the protection of the Free
Speech Clause.240 Therefore, the government must show that the
propaganda speech at issue falls within an already excepted category
of speech.241 In R.A.V., for instance, the Court was unwilling to place
hate speech into an already excepted category; therefore, any government regulation of racially motivated, or otherwise hateful

233

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377, 391–92.
See id.
235
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
236
Id. at 363 (“The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly
virulent form of intimidation.”).
237
Id. at 362 (reasoning that the “Virginia statute does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward ‘one of the specified disfavored topics’” of race, gender, religion, or political affiliation, but rather solely focuses on
whether intimidation was intended).
238
Id. at 360.
239
Id. at 363; see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377, 391–92.
240
Lincoln Caplan, Should Facebook and Twitter Be Regulated Under the
First Amendment?, WIRED (Oct. 11, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/
story/should-facebook-and-twitter-be-regulated-under-the-first-amendment/.
241
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383.
234
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viewpoints, failed constitutional review.242 Following R.A.V., if the
government cannot sufficiently argue that propaganda online falls
into one of these excepted categories, any law banning it would have
to advance a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored—a conclusion this speech-protective Supreme Court is unlikely to make.243 The next Part further explores this question of
whether propaganda could be placed in an already excepted category of speech, or if the Court is more likely to find that it is protected under the First Amendment.
IV.

WOULD THE NETWORK ENFORCEMENT ACT BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THE UNITED STATES?
As discussed above, German freedom of expression under the
Basic Law differs from its U.S. counterpart in significant ways.
First, in Germany, free speech is explicitly limited by the text of the
Basic Law, whereas the U.S. Constitution has no written limits.244
Second, there are far more exceptions to protected speech under
German jurisprudence, whereas the categories of unprotected
speech in the United States are extremely limited.245 Keeping these
differences in mind, an important question arises: whether an act
regulating propaganda, like the Network Enforcement Act,246 would
be deemed unconstitutional in U.S. courts.
To answer this question, a two-part analysis must be employed.247 First, it must be determined whether the First Amendment
242
See id. at 391–92 (“One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all
‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten; but not that all ‘papists’ are, for that would
insult and provoke violence ‘on the basis of religion.’ St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to
follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”).
243
See id. at 381, 399.
244
Compare [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 1, § 1 (“Human dignity
shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.”).
245
Compare supra Part II.C, with supra Part III.A.
246
NetzDG, supra note 6, at § 3(2).
247
Russell W. Galloway, Basic Constitutional Analysis, 28 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 775, 779 (1988). The two-part structure of the analysis is the same for all
constitutional limits. See id. In applying any constitutional restriction on

606

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:572

protects the regulated speech at issue or if the speech falls into an
unprotected category.248 Then, it must be determined what level of
scrutiny applies, depending on whether the law is content-based or
content-neutral.249 For the purposes of this Note, I will be examining
whether a law requiring social media companies to remove “propaganda” specifically would be unconstitutional in the United States.
Focusing on “propaganda” (which is one of the types of speech
banned by the NEA),250 narrows the scope of the analysis while still
encompassing a type of speech that falls under the broad term of
“fake news.”
A.
Is Propaganda Protected Speech?
While there is no set definition for propaganda,251 there is a general consensus that “propaganda attempts to influence the thinking
of people.”252 For the purposes of this Note, propaganda is defined
as false or misleading facts for the purpose of manipulating reality.253 The two most important aspects of propaganda are (1) it is
self-serving, meaning it is meant to benefit the speaker, not the

government action, one should ask first whether the limit is applicable—e.g., is
this the kind of government action that is subject to this limit—and second,
whether the respondent complied with the rules the Supreme Court has developed
for enforcing the limit. Id. at 783–84. In short, the analysis on the merits of any
constitutional limit focuses on two questions: (1) “applicability” and (2) “compliance.” Id. at 779.
248
Supra Part III.
249
Id.
250
See Tahira Mohamedbhai, Germany Cabinet Approves Bill for Social Medial Platforms to Report Hate Speech to Authorities, JURIST (Feb. 21, 2020, 9:03
AM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2020/02/germany-cabinet-approves-bill-forsocial-medial-platforms-to-report-hate-speech-to-authorities/.
251
See, e.g., Propaganda, 13 DIG. INT’L L. 982 (1968) (listing various definitions of propaganda).
252
Id. at 982–83 (quoting L. John Martin, International Propaganda 199
(1958)).
253
See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 490 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
in part) (“[D]eclaration of Leonard W. Doob, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Yale University: . . . .’[A]s the history of the last seventy years suggests, to call something propaganda is to assert that it communicates hidden or
deceitful ideas; that concealed interests are involved; that unfair or insidious methods or [sic] being employed; that its dissemination is systematic and organized in
some way.’”).
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listener; and (2) it manipulates the audience in some way—it might
be through lying or by appealing to racism or other base emotions.254
With this definition in mind, the question of whether propaganda
is protected speech under the First Amendment must be answered.
As discussed in the preceding Part, in general, all communication
and association for purposes of communication are protected by the
First Amendment.255 Certain categories of speech, however, are not
protected. These exceptions include criminal speech, incitement,
fraud, fighting words, obscenity, child pornography, and commercial speech that is misleading or solely concerned with illegal activity.256 Exceptions are extremely limited, and are “confined to the
few ‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar
to the bar.’”257 Noticeably missing from this exhaustive list are
lies258 and hate speech259—categories under which propaganda, as
defined for purposes of this Note, could fall.
In R.A.V., the Court considered whether hate speech would be
protected under the First Amendment and ultimately decided that
hate speech did not fall under any of the excepted categories of

254

See Corbin, supra note 15 (manuscript at 9–11) (defining key characteristics of propaganda to be “manipulativeness”—intentionally undermining reasoned analysis, specifically by relying on falsehoods—and self-serving in nature).
255
See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). As the
Court stated in Mosley, “[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.” Id.
256
See Kelso, supra note 181, at 324; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–
64 (1982).
257
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (first citing United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010); and then quoting Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
258
See id. at 718. In contrast, the Supreme Court has reiterated that lies are
protected speech. See id. at 718 (“Absent from those few categories where the law
allows content-based regulation of speech is any general exception to the First
Amendment for false statements.”).
259
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017). In fact, the Supreme Court
unanimously reaffirmed in Matal v. Tam that there is no hate speech exception to
the First Amendment. Id. (“We have said time and again that ‘the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.’”) (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
592 (1969))).
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speech.260 Similarly, in Alvarez, the Court rejected to categorize lies
as excepted speech or to place it within an already established category.261 Here, propaganda shares similarities with both lies and hate
speech and would likely be categorized the same way: as protected
speech. The Court has been explicitly reluctant to add new categories of exceptions.262 Under U.S. free speech doctrine, propaganda,
therefore, would likely be categorized by the Court as protected
speech.263
B.
What Level of Scrutiny Should be Applied?
The next step in analyzing whether a law regulating propaganda
online is constitutional hinges on the level of scrutiny the Court may
apply.264 In order for a regulation to be content-neutral, it must be
both viewpoint-neutral and subject-matter neutral.265 In other words,
the government cannot regulate speech based on the ideology of the
message266 or the topic of the speech.267 In Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
the Court defined content-based regulation as “a law [that] applies
to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed.”268 The Court, therefore, must consider whether
a law “draws distinctions based on the message a speaker
260

See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–94 (1992).
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717 (first citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460, 470 (2010); and then quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
262
See Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011) (“[N]ew categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that
concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.” (citing United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469–72 (2010))).
263
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709.
264
See supra Part III.1.B.
265
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 57,
59, 61 (1983).
266
See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 312, 333–34 (1988) (declaring unconstitutional a District of Columbia ordinance that prohibited display of signs critical
of a foreign government within 500 feet of that government’s embassy).
267
See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (finding a law prohibiting
all picketing in residential neighborhoods, unless it was labor picketing connected
to a place of employment, unconstitutional); United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp.,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000) (finding that a law regulating only sexual speech
was a subject matter, or content-based, restriction and had to meet strict scrutiny
review).
268
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
261
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conveys.”269 In Reed, the town’s sign code placed limits on temporary directional signs, regulating how long the signs could be displayed and the size.270 However, other signs, such as political or ideological, were not regulated.271 The Court emphasized that the restrictions on any sign, therefore, depend solely on the content of the
message on the sign.272 Based on the Court’s analysis and holding
in Reed, a law requiring the removal of posts containing propaganda
on social media would also be content-based regulation. For instance, a post is defined as propaganda solely based on whether the
post contains a self-serving, manipulative, and false political message.273 This determination, to put it in the Court’s own words,
would be based “entirely on the communicative content of the
sign.”274 Moreover, propaganda posts would be removed, whereas
other posts with different messages would not. Under Reed, subjecting certain posts to different treatment based on the ideas conveyed
is content-based regulation of speech.275 Therefore, strict-scrutiny
must be applied to any law requiring the removal of propaganda
posts from social media.276

269

Id.
Id. at 155.
271
Id. at 167.
272
Id. at 163–64 (“The restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to any given
sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of the sign. If a sign informs its reader of the time and place a book club will discuss John Locke’s Two
Treatises of Government, that sign will be treated differently from a sign expressing the view that one should vote for one of Locke’s followers in an upcoming
election, and both signs will be treated differently from a sign expressing an ideological view rooted in Locke’s theory of government.”).
273
See Corbin, supra note 15 (manuscript at 9–11).
274
Id. at 164.
275
Id. at 168–69, 171, 173.
276
See id. at 172. Additionally, it is important to note that while the Supreme
Court has not expressly held that Internet speech has more protection than any
other speech, the language in Packingham v. North Carolina arguably indicates
that the Court intends to keep Internet speech relatively unregulated. 137 S. Ct.
1730, 1737 (2017). (“Social media allows users to gain access to information and
communicate with one another about it on any subject that might come to
mind . . . . North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are
the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment,
speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the
vast realms of human thought and knowledge.”).
270
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C.
Can the Government Overcome Strict Scrutiny?
To meet the requirements of strict scrutiny, the government must
prove that the regulation at issue: (1) advances a compelling or overriding government ends and (2) is the least restrictive, most effective
means to advance those ends.277 As to the first prong, the proposed
statute asserts a government interest in preserving the democratic
order. By eliminating propaganda, the government would be protecting the voters’ decision-making processes and, thus, ensuring
that elections are not swayed by propaganda or fake news.278
The government could also argue that there is a compelling interest to uphold the integrity of government elections. It could be
argued that the influx of online propaganda interferes with the democratic process as people are unable to genuinely consent-byvote.279 The Supreme Court has accepted preserving the integrity of
elections as a compelling government interest.280 In Burson v. Freeman, the Supreme Court ruled that a Tennessee statute, forbidding
the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign
materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities, survived
strict scrutiny.281 The Court found that there was a compelling governmental interest in “protecting voters from confusion and undue
influence”282 and that the government has an “indisputably . . . compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.”283
277

See Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, supra note 190, at 909.
See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (finding the prevention of factionalism and the stability of political systems as compelling state interests). The Court may accept this as a compelling government interest, because
the Court has upheld parallel interests as compelling in the past. See id.; Am. Party
of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1974) (finding a compelling state interests in preserving integrity of electoral process and regulating number of candidates on ballot so as to avoid voter confusion).
279
Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice”
Standard, 82 TUL. L. REV. 889, 897 (2008) (“If voters are misled, elections may
not accurately reflect the desires of the electorate.”).
280
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (finding a compelling
government interest in protecting its citizen’s right to vote freely and effectively).
281
See id. at 193, 207, 213–14.
282
See id. at 199. The Court also emphasized that there is a “‘right to vote
freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society.’”
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
283
Id. at 196 (quoting Eu v. S.F. City Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
228–29 (1989)).
278
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Not only did the government in Burson show that there was a compelling interest in protecting voters from undue influence, but the
government also showed that the statute was narrowly tailored and
necessary to serve that interest.284
However, to prove there is a compelling interest, as Justice
Scalia wrote in Brown v. Entertainment Merchant Association,
“[t]he State must specifically identify an ‘actual problem’ in need of
solving . . . and the curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the solution.”285 Therefore, the government must prove
that fake news, specifically propaganda, causes confusion among
voters and directly alters the outcome of elections and that eliminating propaganda is necessary to eliminate that confusion.286 In sum,
while preventing corruption and upholding the integrity of democratic elections are compelling interests,287 the state must show there
is actual, concrete risk posed by the dissemination of propaganda on
social media.288
Even if the Court accepts that there is a compelling government
interest behind requiring the removal of propaganda from social media sites, the government must still prove that the statute is the least
restrictive means to ensure that end.289 If there is a less restrictive
alternative to accomplish a compelling interest, the statute will not

284
Id. at 206–11 (finding that based on history of voter fraud and intimidation,
and on past findings that interferences right before voting can be significant for a
person deciding on a candidate, requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from polling
centers “does not constitute an unconstitutional compromise”).
285
See Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (quoting United
States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000)).
286
Id.; see United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000)
(establishing that “the Government must present more than anecdote and supposition”); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012) (“There must
be a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”).
287
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992).
288
See Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 822; see also Alvarez, 567 U.S. at
725.
289
Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
395 (1992)) (stating that the government can only meet requirements of strict
scrutiny if regulation at issue is justified by a “compelling government interest
and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”).
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pass strict scrutiny.290 The government, therefore, has the burden of
proving why other methods, such as counter-speech, education, or
self-regulation, would not be sufficient in combatting the issue propaganda presents to the democratic process.291 As the Court in Burson
emphasized, it is extremely rare for the Court to accept government
regulation over another recourse.292
Most notably, the Court has required the government to show
that counter-speech would not work to achieve its interests.293 Justice Kennedy in Alvarez opined that “[t]he remedy for speech that is
false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”294
Proving that counter-speech would not be sufficiently effective in
combatting the effects of propaganda online would be a difficult
burden to overcome, as there are a plethora of legitimate news
sources and fact-checking organizations that can work to debunk
fake political posts.295 In addition, the government could itself invest
in the creation of government-run fact-checking sites and online political news outlets.296 It is clear then that the Court would find there
are other, less restrictive means to remedy the effect of propaganda
on elections.

290

See Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 816 (“When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the Government’s obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its
goals.”).
291
See id.; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 190, at 792.
292
Burson, 504 U.S. at 211 (“[W]e reaffirm that it is the rare case in which we
have held that a law survives strict scrutiny. This, however, is such a rare case.”).
293
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 726.
294
Id. at 727.
295
See POLITIFACT, https://www.politifact.com/; Fact Checker, THE
WASHINGTON POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-Checker/; Fact
Checks, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/spotlight/fact-checks.
296
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 729. Justice Kennedy in Alvarez suggested a similar solution, stating that the government could create a database listing past Medal
of Honor recipients, which would protect the integrity of the military awards system while, at the same time, avoiding a restriction on speech. Id.
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V. THE COUNTER-SPEECH SOLUTION
The Supreme Court has continuously denied government regulation in favor of counter-speech;297 however, counter-speech in
America may not be entirely effective.298 First, in the age of social
media, most people receive their news on Twitter, Facebook, and
other social media sites.299 Each of these online sources utilize extremely sophisticated algorithms that provide every unique user with
tailored content based on what that user typically reads, who that
user’s followers are, and what those followers read or post about.300
Therefore, as a society, we are only being exposed to information
that social media sites have calculated we will be predisposed to
agree with and enjoy.301 The sophistication of social media has essentially done away with the very idea of counter-speech.302
Therefore, if the government is unable to regulate what is posted
on social media, government regulation of social media algorithms
is another way to ensure that there is a free flow of information.303
Regulations should require that search engines and social media
companies make it explicitly known to “users that they are subject
to algorithms,” detail how the algorithms are filtering posts or search
results, and allow users to manually disable or change how the

297

See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence.”).
298
See Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution:
First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM.
L.J. 55, 67–68 (2018) (discussing inadequacy of counter-speech in the digital era).
299
See Mike Vorhaus, People Increasingly Turn to Social Media For News,
FORBES (June 24, 2020, 9:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikevorhaus/
2020/06/24/people-increasingly-turn-to-social-media-for-news/#10dd99f63bcc.
300
See Elizabeth Van Couvering, Is Relevance Relevant? Market, Science,
and War: Discourses of Search Engine Quality, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED
COMM. 866, 871–72 (2007); Theodora Lau & Uday Akkaraju, When Algorithms
Decide Whose Voices Will Be Heard, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/11/when-algorithms-decide-whose-voice-will-be-heard.
301
See Couvering, supra note 300, at 875.
302
See id.; Lau & Akkaraju, supra note 300.
303
See Julia K. Brotman, Access, Transparency, and Control: A Proposal to
Restore the Marketplace of Ideas by Regulating Search Engine Algorithms, 39
WHITTIER L. REV. 33, 50–53 (2018) (discussing regulating algorithms).
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content is filtered.304 These proposed changes would protect informational autonomy, diversity, and quality, as well as the democratic
society overall. However, it is unclear whether algorithms can be
regulated without violating the Free Speech Clause.305
Another possible solution, which does not require any government regulation, would be to invest in the U.S. news infrastructure.
Currently, it is almost impossible for Americans to access neutral
news sources.306 Trust in the news media in the United States is extremely low overall307 because most available news sources are extremely partisan,308 and the decline of local newspapers has likely
only exacerbated the divide. As it stands, for counter-speech to be
effective, there needs to be a major shift in American trust of the
media. The solution, as proposed in this Note, is to fully invest in
our public news networks. Specifically, the government should

304

See id. at 54. The list set forth by Brotman is more narrowly tailored for
search engines, specifically Google, whereas I have expanded the regulation to
include social media sites.
305
See id. at 61–62. (discussing the constitutionality of regulating algorithms).
According to Brotman, it is likely that algorithms are protected speech under the
editorial discretion doctrine. Id. However, Brotman goes on to argue that a court
should uphold the proposed regulation as a constitutional restriction on speech.
Id. at 62–63.
306
See The Berlin School of Creative Leadership, 10 Journalism Brands
Where You Find Real Facts Rather Than Alternative Facts, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2017,
1:10
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/berlinschoolofcreativeleadership/
2017/02/01/10-journalism-brands-where-you-will-find-real-facts-rather-than-alternative-facts/#26503a60e9b5.
307
See Amy Mitchell et al., Many Americans Say Made-Up News Is a Critical
Problem That Needs to Be Fixed, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 5, 2019),
https://www.journalism.org/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-isa-critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/.
308
See Shawn Langlio, How Biased is Your News Source? You Probably
Won’t Agree with This Chart, MKT. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2018, 9:30 AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-biased-is-your-news-source-you-probably-wont-agree-with-this-chart-2018-02-28; Julie Bosman, How the Collapse of
Local News Is Causing a “National Crisis,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/us/local-news-disappear-pen-america.html
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invest more in the CPB,309 which includes the Public Broadcasting
Network (“PBS”)310 and National Public Radio.311
The United Kingdom’s BBC network stands as an effective example of a well-funded, well-respected public news organization.312
According to a Pew Research Center survey about news media and
politics in the United Kingdom, British adults, “both those on the
ideological right and left, cite the BBC as their main news
source.”313 Additionally, in the United Kingdom, around eight-inten adults (79%) say they trust the public news organization BBC.314
In contrast, Pew Research Center explored the attitude towards news
media in the United States, finding that out of thirty main-stream
media organizations, not a single one was “trusted by more than
50% of all U.S. adults.”315
The BBC is based on a Royal Charter,316 granting incorporation
and full independence to act solely “in the public interest, serving
all audiences through the provision of impartial, high-quality and
distinctive output and services which inform, educate and

309

About Public Media, CPB, https://www.cpb.org/aboutpb (last visited Dec.
20, 2020).
310
PBS, https://www.pbs.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
311
NPR, https://www.npr.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
312
See BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18027956 (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
313
Amy Mitchell et al., Fact Sheet: News Media and Political Attitudes in the
United Kingdom, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 17, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/fact-sheet/news-media-and-political-attitudes-in-the-unitedkingdom/.
314
Id.
315
U.S. Media Polarization and the 2020 Election: A Nation Divided, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.journalism.org/2020/01/24/u-s-mediapolarization-and-the-2020-election-a-nation-divided/.
316
DEPARTMENT FOR CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT, COPY OF THE ROYAL
CHARTER FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF THE BRITISH BROADCASTING NETWORK,
Dec. 2016 [hereinafter CHARTER FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF BBC], https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/577829/57964_CM_9365_Charter_Accessible.pdf; see Letter to Lord
Chancellor on the granting of a Royal Charter to the BBC from The Earl of Belfour (Nov. 19, 1926), https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/twenties-britain-part-two/royal-charter-for-bbc/.
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entertain.”317 The BBC is further regulated by Ofcom,318 the communications regulatory authority in the United Kingdom.319 Ofcom
sets forth various rules and regulation to ensure the impartiality of
the BBC, such as the Ofcom Broadcasting Code (“the Code”).320
Under Section 5 of the Code: “[N]ews, in whatever form, must be
reported with due accuracy and presented with due impartiality.”321
The BBC is a unique organization. While funded by taxes,322 the
BBC is set up as an independent corporation, yet it still must adhere
to certain rules and regulations323 to ensure its impartiality and its
mission as an organization purely for the people.324 Despite its distinctiveness as a quasi-government organization, or perhaps because
of it, the BBC is cited as the main news source for people on both
left and right ideologies in the United Kingdom.325
While the United States does in fact have a public news system,326 it lacks the reach the BBC commands.327 The disparity in
viewership most likely stems from the gap in funding between the
317

CHARTER FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF BBC, supra note 316, at art. 3, § 5.
Id. at art. 44; Ofcom Broadcasting Code, Jan. 2019 [hereinafter Ofcom
Broadcasting Code], https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/
132073/Broadcast-Code-Full.pdf.
319
Communications Act 2003 c. 198 (Eng.) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2003/21/section/198.
320
Ofcom Broadcasting Code, supra note 318.
321
Id. at § 5.
322
See BBC, License Fee and Funding, https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/
governance/licencefee (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
323
See Ofcom Broadcasting Code, supra note 318.
324
About the BBC, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/mission (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
325
Fact Sheet: News Media and Political Attitudes in the United Kingdom,
supra note 273. This is in direct contrast to the U.S., where people on different
sides of the ideological spectrum choose different news sources. See U.S. Media
Polarization and the 2020 Election: A Nation Divided, supra note 315.
326
See 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1967). Under the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967,
Congress created the CPB, which consists of PBS and NPR. See id.; see also CPB
FAQ, https://www.cpb.org/faq (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) (“CPB is the steward
of the federal government’s investment in public media.”).
327
PBS reaches approximately 109 million viewers each month, whereas the
BBC reaches 426 million people weekly. Overview, PBS, http://about.lunchbox.pbs.org/about/about-pbs/overview/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2020); BBC, GROUP
ANNUAL REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS at 12, 48, 50, 52 (2018–2019), https://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualreport/2018-19.pdf.
318
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two entities. For instance, PBS is funded mostly by government
grants and private donations.328 PBS brings in approximately $600
million a year in funding,329 compared to the over £3 billion the BBC
receives from a licensing tax.330 To truly combat the effects of fake
news in the United States, and to ensure that counter-speech is actually effective, the U.S. government needs to fund the CPB and PBS
more appropriately. With nearly 600% more funding than PBS, it is
no surprise that the BBC’s reach is similarly proportioned.
Another important difference between the BBC and PBS is the
regulation structure. The BBC is regulated by Ofcom and the strict
“rules of impartiality” it sets;331 however, the CPB and PBS are not
similarly regulated.332 The public news in the United States does not
have the same impartiality standards as the United Kingdom. 333 If
counter-speech is going to be used as an effective tool against fake
news, there must be a reliable, impartial, news source to command
the trust and respect of viewers within the United States.
Overall, if it is not possible to combat the fake news problem in
the United States through government regulation, then the United
States must invest in its news infrastructure to ensure there is sufficient informational diversity and quality.
328

See PBS, PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCAST AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT 5–8, (2019),
https://bento.cdn.pbs.org/hostedbento-prod/filer_public/PBS_About/Files%
20and%20Thumbnails/Finances/2019%20PBS%20Financial%20Report.pdf.
329
Id.
330
BBC GROUP ANNUAL REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS, supra note 327 (converts
to $3.57 billion in U.S. dollars).
331
Content Standards, OFCOM, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-ondemand/information-for-industry/bbc-operating-framework/content-standards
(last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
332
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (1967), with CHARTER FOR THE
CONTINUANCE OF BBC, supra note 316, at § 44.
333
See Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, Report Regarding
Handling of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26372, 26374, par. 15 (July 18, 1974)
(“‘the doctrine’ involves a two-fold duty: (1) The broadcaster must devote a reasonable percentage of . . . broadcast time to the coverage of public issues, and (2)
his coverage of these issues must be fair in the sense that it provides an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of view.”) The Fairness Doctrine,
which set forth impartiality standards in the United States, was repealed by President Reagan. See id.; Dan Fletcher, A Brief History of The Fairness Doctrine,
TIME
(Feb.
20,
2009),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1880786,00.html.
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CONCLUSION
A statute requiring the removal of propaganda material on social
media sites, like Germany’s NEA, would likely be unconstitutional
in the United States. First, the speech at issue, propaganda, is protected by the First Amendment.334 Second, the regulation in question
qualifies as content-based because it only targets a particular type of
message and topic.335 The Supreme Court, moreover, would apply a
strict scrutiny review of the statute, a heavy burden for the government to overcome.336 Under strict scrutiny, the government may be
able to prove that there is a compelling government interest in protecting the democratic order and process. However, it is unlikely that
the Court will accept the statute as the only means of achieving that
end, where other measures, such as counter-speech, are likely to
remedy the problem in a less speech-restrictive manner.337
However, social media is certainly changing the way we communicate with one another, and the way that we gather information.
An argument can therefore be made that U.S. free speech laws are
too stringent. As the Court itself has admitted in Packingham v.
North Carolina, “we cannot appreciate yet” the “full dimensions and
vast potential” of the “Cyber Age.”338 While this Note discusses a
purely hypothetical statute, it becomes more plausible every day that
there may need to be some form of government regulation on social
media. The 2016 and 2020 elections, and events throughout 2020
and early 2021, have highlighted the huge role that social media now
plays in our politics and society. Yet, as Justice Alito points out in
his dissent in Packingham, the Court itself has not “heeded its own
admonition of caution” regarding the regulation of social media.339
The language employed by the majority in Packingham “indicates
that the Court intends to keep Internet speech as unregulated as
334
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (declining to add
lies as a new excepted category of speech).
335
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
336
Supra Part III.B.2.
337
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729 (2012) (holding that counter-speech was a viable, less restrictive way of protecting the government interest
at hand. Specifically, the Court recommended the creation of a database that could
list Medal of Honor recipients, and thus protect the integrity of the military from
people who lie about receiving such awards).
338
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).
339
Id. at 1744 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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possible.”340 There will, in fact, be consequences to this “undisciplined dicta”341 as the influence of social media continues to rise,
and the government lacks any ability to regulate the information exchanged online.
As this Note has explored, an attempt by the government to regulate the dissemination of fake news or, specifically, propaganda
would likely be deemed unconstitutional. The very real threat to our
democratic order and voting process would thus go unchecked,
while countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, have
taken concrete steps towards regulating the wild west of social media. The longstanding and pervasive distrust of the government that
underlies many decisions to uphold free speech in the face of government regulation serves as the greatest barrier to propaganda regulation.342 A persuasive argument to overcome this barrier is that the
cost of government censorship will invariably exceed the cost of
regulating (arguably harmful) speech343 and that reliance on counter-speech is misplaced. Unless there is significant investment in a
neutral, reliable news source, counter-speech will simply not be effective in combatting the real issues that fake news causes within
our democratic society.
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Zipursky, supra note 164, at 1345.
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., dissenting).
342
See Krotoszynski, supra note 179, at 221–22 (2015) (for analysis of this
distrust in America and elsewhere).
343
See id.
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